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INTRODUCTION
Appellant Paula Mitchell was instructed several years ago when the real estate
market collapsed by the loan servicer of her home loan, that in order to get a loan
modification she would have to stop making the monthly payments and then she would
receive a loan modification.
Trusting what she was told, she followed the instructions and stopped making her
payments in order to get the modification. After a few months she tried to make a
payment but her payment was sent back to her. While waiting for the modification, her
loan servicer never made any demand for the missed payments, understood they would be
resolved by the modification.
After several months of waiting for the loan modification, and repeatedly sending
the same documents over and over because the servicer said it had not received them, or
they had been lost, etc., she was eventually told that she would not get the loan
modification because her loan was not the type that could be modified (a fact the servicer
had apparently known all along but did not disclose to Mitchell).
She was also told that she was now in “default” and had to immediately pay all of
the missed payments that would have been taken care of by the modification, or her
house would be foreclosed. Unfortunately, since this amount had grown quite large
while the servicer needlessly dragged out the modification for months, it was a lump sum
of tens of thousands of dollars by this point, and she could not cure the arrears all at once.
ReconTrust then started non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.
6

Mitchell learned that she had been lied to because she did not need to miss any
payment to obtain a loan modification, and that she had been a victim of a systematic
scam by the loan servicer whereby homeowners were tricked into “defaulting” and then
the modification process was dragged out for months so that the arrears would grow
prohibitively large, thereby guaranteeing the arrears could not be cured so that the house
would go into foreclosure, whereby the owners/servicers of her Loan could collect
“insurance” as a result of the purported “default” that would pay the difference between
the value of her home and the balance of her loan (which was more than the value of the
home), or more, such that when the Loan was then foreclosed the owners would recover
mot just the depressed market value of the house, but the full amount of the outstanding
loan, or more.
Mitchell accordingly brought suit to stop the threatened non-judicial foreclosure
she had been tricked into, and to be able to resume making regular payments and keep
her home, as well as several other claims. The lawsuit sought several judicial
declarations as to who owned her Loan, what rights the owners might have, whether
insurance had paid down the Loan, challenging ReconTrust’s and BNYM’s right to
conduct any foreclosure, etc. This case is referred to herein as Mitchell I. Because of the
lawsuit, the non-judicial foreclosure was cancelled.
By virtue of several mistakes by the trial court, Mitchel I was improperly
“dismissed” even though many of the claims brought therein were never addressed at all,
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let alone resolved on the merits. The judge steadfastly refused to address the unresolved
claims so they remain unresolved to this day.
BNYM did not resume any non-judicial foreclosure. When someone realized that
there was not enough time to complete a non-judicial foreclosure before the statute of
limitations would run, BNYM filed the present judicial foreclosure action on the eve of
the limitation.
Mitchell accordingly brought counter actions to stop the judicial foreclosure, and
to seek the judicial declarations that were ignored in Mitchell I, such as who in fact owns
her loan, and to seek equitable reformation of the Loan so that she may resume making
regular payments on her Loan in order to keep her home, etc.
BNYM was not the original lender on the Loan. To this day, BNYM has refused
to provide any documentation showing that it in fact owns the Debt or has any interest in
the Property. In particular, it has refused to produce any evidence proving that it actually
owns the “Trustee’s Lien it is seeking to judicially foreclose.

8

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
The trial court erred in holding that BNYM has standing to bring this
foreclosure action.
SOR:

Legal question;

Preserved:

Motion to Dismiss REC.96; Reply REC.148,
Answer REC.444; Amended Answer Rec.538
Rule 59 Motion REC.1081; Reply REC.1134

II.
Trial court erred in ruling BNYM did not waive its claim of judicial
foreclosure by not bringing is as a counterclaim in Mitchell I.
SOR:

Interpretation/Application of Rules, legal question;
USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31.

Preserved:

Motion to Dismiss: REC.202, REPLY REC.311__
Rule 59 Motion REC.1081; Reply REC.1134

III.

Trial court erred dismissing Mitchell’s counterclaims based on Res Judicata.
SOR:

Legal Question

Preserved:

Second Counterclaim REC.538
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; REC.711

IV.
I.

Trial Court erred in dismissing counterclaims collaterally attacking Mitchell
SOR:

Interpretation/Application of Rules, legal question; Same

Preserved:

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; REC.711
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V.
Trial Court erred by granting BNYM summary judgment without BNYM
satisfying its initial burdens with supporting evidence.
SOR:

Interpretation/Application of Rules, legal question; Same

Preserved:

Opposition Motion for Summary Judgment REC.901
Paula Mitchell Declaration REC.929
Wade Mitchell Declaration REC.936
Objection Proposed Order REC.988

VI. Trial court erred in treating its purported “Final Judgment” as a final
judgment.
SOR:

Interpretation/Application of Rules, legal question; Same

Preserved:

Objection to Premature Sua Sponte “Final Judgment” REC.1033.
Rule 59 Motion REC.1081; Reply REC.1134
Rule 64 Reply and Motion to Recall Order of Foreclosure Sale
REC.1166; Reply REC.1298

VIII. Trial court erred by not correcting its own legal errors raised in the Rule
59/52 motion.
SOR:

Interpretation/Application of Rules, legal question; Same

Preserved:

No opportunity to do so since court’s refusal to do so was part of
Rule 59 Ruling, which came straight to appeal

10

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Paula Mitchell has been fighting for years to keep her home after being
tricked into skipping payments in order to obtain a loan modification as discussed above.
BNYM brought this judicial foreclosure action pursuant to UCA 78B-6-901.
Mitchell claims that BNYM does not have the right to bring this suit, and has
equitable defenses which were raised as counterclaims as well as numerous other claims
for declaratory judgments and various claims for damages, and a quiet title action, and a
potential class action. See Answer and Counterclaim for greater detail. REC.538
Procedural History
The relevant procedural history is set forth in that Summary of Issues section.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mitchell moved to dismiss this case due to BNYM’s lack of standing because
BNYM not claim, nor has it proved, that it owns the Debt which is necessary since under
UCA 57-1-35 the Trustee’s Lien supposedly being foreclosed here is automatically
transferred to whomever owns the Debt. BNYM instead asserts that it has been
“assigned” an unidentified “beneficial interest” in the Trust Deed by MERS, but MERS
was never given any “beneficial interest” that it could possible assign to BNYM.
Therefore, BNYM has absolutely no legally protectible interest in the Mitchell Debt that
gives it standing to bring this action. The court erroneously denied the Motion without
analysis by incorrectly assuming that the question of standing was decided in Mitchell I
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which was error because the issues were not “identical” because standing to bring a legal
action in court is very different from having contractual authority to appoint a successor
trustee as a nominee, which was the issue decided in Mitchell I.
Mitchell next moved to dismiss because when BNYM filed its answer in Mitchell
I, it did not file a judicial foreclosure action as a counterclaim, as mandated by Rule
13(a), and therefore it waived this action and is forever barred from litigating it. The
court, however, created a novel unwritten exception to Rule 13(a) by holding that even
though this judicial foreclosure action clearly falls within the plain language of Rule
13(a), Mitchell cannot force a judicial foreclosure action as a counterclaim. This was an
erroneous legal ruling contrary to the governing law which does not allow any exceptions
to Rule 13(a).
BNYM next moved to dismiss all of Mitchell’s counterclaims falsely claiming that
they were all barred by Res Judicata. The court improperly dismissed all of Mitchell’s
counterclaims on a wholesale basis without conducting the mandatory issue by issue or
claim by claim Res Judicata analysis. Had it done so, it could not have dismissed the
counterclaims.
BNYM next moved for summary judgment on its own claim which the court
improperly granted since BNYM did not make any effort to perform it initial burdens to
prove entitlement as a matter of law by proving each element with evidence in the record.
Nor did it prove with evidence in the record that the facts are undisputed.
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The court entered an order of only partial summary judgment on BNYM’s claim
which expressly preserved for future adjudication the amount of attorney fees, and
interest and other fines and fees etc. after May 31, 2017.
Despite the fact there were future adjudications expressly reserved in the order, the
court sua sponte prepared its own “Final Judgment” and entered it the same day in
violation of Rule 58A. But the premature sua sponte “Final Judgment” also reserved for
future adjudication the question of attorney fees and interest etc. post May 31st. It
therefore clearly was not a final judgment.
The court nevertheless improperly ordered enforcement of the interlocutory “Final
Judgment” by sending an Order for Foreclosure Sale to the Sheriff.
Given the trial court’s insistence that its “Final Judgment” was in fact final,
Mitchell brought a combined Rule 52/59 Motion addressing the numerous errors made by
the court, but the court refused to address the substance of the Motion, asserting that an
appeal was Mitchell’s only avenue if she did not like its rulings.
When the Order of Foreclosure sale was served, Mitchell brought a Rule 64 Reply
and motion to recall or discharge the premature Order since there was still no final
judgment with the total amount due as required by statute. But the court once again
summarily denied the Motion without any substantive analysis.
The court has now adjudicated the amount of attorney fees, but it still has not
adjudicated the post May 31st interest, fees, fines etc. Therefore, there is still no final
13

appealable judgment resolving all claims between the parties. But since the trial court has
insisted that its “Final Judgment” was in fact final, and this Court has required the appeal
move forward, Mitchell has been forced to appeal, but she recognizes that this Court will
likely need to dismiss this appeal due to the lack of appellate jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
I.
The trial court erred in holding that BNYM has standing to bring this
foreclosure action.
The trial court erred when it denied Mitchell’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
this judicial foreclosure action due to BNYM’s lack of standing to foreclose the Trustee’s
Lien because it does not own the Mitchell Debt which the Trustee’s Lien secures, and it
is not the real party in interest.1
A plaintiff cannot bring an action asserting the claim of a third party. A plaintiff
must affirmatively prove it is asserting its own claim for an injury caused to it by the
defendant in order to have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to decide the
controversy.
[P14] Utah's traditional standing test requires a showing of injury, causation, and
redressability. Under the first prong of the traditional test, "the petitioning party
must allege that it has suffered or will 'suffer some distinct and palpable injury
that gives it a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute.'"
Additionally, the party seeking relief must establish that it has a "legally
protectable interest in the controversy." And with the exception of those who
are third-party beneficiaries or assignees, only those who are a party to a
contract have a legally protectable interest in that contract. See Holmes Dev.,
LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, P 53, 48 P.3d 895 and n.6, 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d 895
(stating that generally only a party to a contract has an interest in the contract
Rule 17 explicitly mandates that: “Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest.”
1
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and thus standing to sue); see also Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 1999
UT 34, P 20, 976 P.2d 1213 (holding that an individual who is not a party to a
contract does not generally have standing because the individual has no
cognizable interest in the agreement).
City of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Tooele City, 233 P.3d 461 (Utah
2010)(citations omitted).
The trial court granted the Jenkinses' motion for summary judgment as to this
cause of action because it determined that DUC lacked standing to assert a claim
on Alan Jenkins's behalf. "In essence, the question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues." To this end, "a party may generally assert only his or her own
rights and cannot raise the claims of third parties who are not before the
court." Id.
DU Company v Jenkins, 2009 Utah App 195, ¶ 11 (citation omitted). See also, BV
Lending v. Jordanelle Special Serv. Dist., 2013 UT App 9, ¶ 10 (“BV Jordanelle could
not litigate the rights of BV Lending because it was not BV Lending’s successor in
interest to the promissory notes or the deed of trust”).
In simple terms: “Traditional standing criteria require that the interests of the
parties be adverse and that the party seeking relief have a legally protectable interest in
the controversy.” State ex rel. H.J. v State, 1999 UT App 238, ¶ 17.222222222626.20.
But BNYM made no effort to prove that it personally has a legally protectable
interest. Therefore it has failed to prove it has any standing.
A.
BNYM has not proven any personal interest in this controversy by virtue of
the purported “assignment” from MERS.
BNYM does not claim to actually own the Mitchell Debt for which the Trust Deed
was granted to ensure repayment.2

2

BNYM in fact affirmatively claimed it is not a party to the Note or Trust Deed in Mitchell v.
ReconTrust et al, 3rd District, case no 110400816, so as to avoid liability for a claim of
contractual damages.
15

Rather, BNYM claims to be the “Beneficiary” of the Trust Deed by virtue of an
“assignment” from MERS of some unidentified “beneficial interest” in the Trust Deed.
But MERS had no “beneficial interest” in the Trust Deed to assign BNYM because it
lacked any ownership interest in the Debt it secured.
As this Court acknowledged in Mitchell v. ReconTrust, 2016 UT App. 88, fn 5
(involving this same loan)(“Mitchell I”), the theory that MERS could be a “beneficiary”
under a trust deed is flawed, citing to Burnett v. MERS, 706 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013)
wherein the 10th Circuit held that MERS could not be “the person named or otherwise
designated in a trust deed as the person, for whose benefit a trust did is given,” because
MERS held “no ownership right in the Note.”
It is indisputable that MERS was not given any beneficial interest by the Trust
Deed. To the contrary, the Trust Deed expressly rebuts any claim that MERS was
granted any “beneficial interest” by stating: “MERS holds only legal title to the interests
granted by borrower in this security instrument.” REC.16
"It is well established that an assignor cannot assign rights he or she does not
have.". "The assignee acquires all of the rights and remedies possessed by the
assignor at the time of the assignment . . . .” But an “assignee gains nothing more,
and acquires no greater interest than had his assigner.” Thus, “the assignee never
stands in a better position than the assignor."
Todd Hollow Apts. v. Homes at Deer Mt. HOA, 2015 UT App 190, ¶ 23 (citations
omitted).
Since MERS lacked any “beneficial interest” to assign, BNYM has not been
“assigned” any “beneficial interest” by MERS as a matter of law.
Consequently, in order for BNYM to have a legally protectible interest that would
16

give it standing, BNYM needed to prove that it in fact owns the Mitchell Debt.
Only the actual owner of a debt secured by a trust deed holds the “beneficial
interest” created by the trust deed, namely the trustee’s lien, since the trustee’s lien is
inseparable from the debt.
The law seems to be well settled that the mortgage is a mere incident to the debt
and that its transfer or assignment does not transfer or assign the debt or the
note. The mortgage goes with the note. If the latter is transferred or assigned, the
mortgage automatically goes along with the assignment or transfer. . . . The
mortgage, being a mere incident of the debt, cannot be assigned separately
from it, so as to give any beneficial interest. . . . A mortgage, as distinct from the
debt it secures, is not a thing of value nor a fit subject of transfer; hence an
assignment of the mortgage alone, without the debt, is nugatory, and confers
no rights whatever upon the assignee. . . . An assignment of the note carries the
mortgage with it, while the assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.
Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz. 561, 568, 84 P.2d 575, 578 (1938).
This concept is codified in Utah by UCA 57-1-35, titled “Trust Deed – Transfer of
secured debts as transfer of security,” which makes it perfectly clear: “The transfer of any
debt secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer of the security therefor.”
Consequently, BNYM’s theory that it became the current “beneficiary” by virtue
of the “assignment” from MERS fails as a matter of law.
Since BNYM has failed to prove any legally protectable interest of its own, it has
failed to meet its burden to prove it has standing to bring this judicial foreclosure action.
The party invoking … jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these
elements [i.e., the elements of standing]. Since they are not mere pleading
requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element
must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof, …
Brown v. Div. Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ¶14.
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Accordingly, the trial court never acquired any jurisdiction to entertain this
foreclosure action. Brown at ¶12 (“standing is a jurisdictional requirement”).
Consequently, all of the trial court’s actions must be vacated due to the lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Bott v., Bott, 437 P.2d 329 (Utah 1968)(absent jurisdiction, a
court’s “subsequent proceedings are palpably null and void”).
“If a court acts beyond its authority those acts are null and void. Therefore, the
initial inquiry of any court should always be to determine whether the requested
action is within its jurisdiction. When a matter is outside the court’s jurisdiction it
retains only the authority to dismiss the action.”
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989)
“A court must have subject matter jurisdiction to have the power and authority to
decide a controversy. Without subject matter jurisdiction a court cannot proceed.” Burns
Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate, 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1993). “Because it is a
threshold issue, we address jurisdictional questions before resolving other claims.”
Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 44 P.3d 724, ¶11 (Utah 2002).
[S]ubject matter jurisdiction goes to the very power of a court to entertain
an action. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around
nor cured by a waiver. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at
any time and when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the
parties nor the court can do anything to fill that void.
Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990); Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d
1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987)(“subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created or conferred
on the court by consent or waiver”).
B.
The trial court erred in holding BNYM’s standing to bring suit was decided
by Mitchell I.
The trial court improperly refused to even address Mitchell’s standing challenge
on the merits when she brought a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss by mistakenly holding
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the BNYM’s right to foreclose judicially was decided in Mitchell I. The court correctly
stated the law:

(i) [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party to
. . .the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be
identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action
must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must
have resulted in a final judgment on the merits."
Snyder v. Murray City, 2003 UT 13, 35.
But the trial court failed to correctly apply each element of issue preclusion
because it did not determine if the issues were “identical” in each case. Rather it only
concluded that the issue in Mitchell I “underpins” Defendant's standing argument, rather
than find it was “identical.” “[T]he issue decided in the prior adjudication must be
identical to the one presented in the instant action.” Oman v. Davis School District,
2008 UT 70, ¶29.
The “issue” in Mitchell I was whether BNYM could appoint ReconTrust to be a
successor trustee. The issue in this case is whether BNYM has standing to bring a
judicial foreclosure action. These obviously are not “identical” issues, so the court erred
in concluding that collateral estoppel applied.3

The court cited paragraphs 20, 22, 23, and n.5 of this Court’s opinion in Mitchell I. But those
paragraphs actually contradict the court’s conclusion because they show this Court was not
discussing whether BNYM has standing to bring a judicial foreclosure, but rather, whether
MERS could appoint a successor trustee to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure.
Paragraph 20 states: “even if the Mitchells are correct that MERS does not meet this
definition, the terms of the trust deed nevertheless gave MERS the authority to appoint a
successor trustee and foreclose upon the property.”
3
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The court therefore erred as a matter of law in concluding that Mitchell was
precluded by collateral estoppel from challenging BNYM’s standing to bring this lawsuit.
Accordingly it should have addressed the merits of the jurisdictional challenge, even
though it didn’t, this Court must now address it since jurisdiction may be raised at any
time and this Court cannot affirm the trial court’s actions if it lacks jurisdiction.

II.
Trial court erred in ruling BNYM did not waive its claim of judicial
foreclosure by not bringing is as a counterclaim in Mitchell I.
Mitchell moved to dismiss BNYM’s judicial foreclosure action as being waived
and forever barred because BNYM did not bring it in Mitchell I as a compulsory
counterclaim under Rule 13(a). Rather than dismiss this action as mandated by the case
law interpreting Rule 13(a), the trial court improperly created for the first time ever its
own exception to Rule 13(a).
This is the second attempt of Bank of New York Mellon (“BNYM”) to foreclose
on the Property owned by Paula Mitchell. The first attempt was by means of a threatened
unlawful non-judicial foreclosure sale by ReconTrust, which resulted in a preemptive
quiet title action filed by the Mitchells in the Third District, case no. 110400816, before
the foreclosure sale, Mitchell I, at which point ReconTrust cancelled the non-judicial

Paragraph 21, which the Court skipped over, also plainly states: “Case law from this
court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals indicates that a trust deed’s plain language may
give MERS, as ‘nominee for Lender and Lendor’s successors and assigns,’ the authority to
appoint a successor trustee.”
Again paragraph 22 states: “Consistent with this case law, we conclude that the terms of
the trust deed in this case explicitly gave MERS the right to appoint a successor trustee
regardless of whether MERS satisfied the statutory definition of beneficiary.”
20

sale, and it was never resumed.
BNYM was a defendant in Mitchell I which expressly challenged whether BNYM
had any recognizable interest in Mitchell’s Property, in particular, whether BNYM had
any ownership interest in the Debt and the Trustee’s Lien, and any right to foreclose the
Trustee’s Lien based on the alleged default on the Mitchell Note.
BNYM filed an answer on March 20, 2012, but it did not assert any counterclaims.
In particular, it did not assert a judicial foreclosure action as a counterclaim, although it
was necessarily asserting a right to do so because it was asserting the right to pursue a
non-judicial foreclosure.
It thereby made its election of remedies and waived any right to bring a judicial
foreclosure. But once it was too late for BNYM to complete a non-judicial foreclosure
before the statute of limitations ran, BNYM changed its mind and filed this judicial
foreclosure instead, on April 15, 2016, in direct violation of Rule 13(a).

Mitchell

therefore moved to dismiss it, REC.96, but the trial court denied the Motion on
November 21, 2016. REC.360.
Rule 13(a) expressly states:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of
serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
It is undisputed that Mitchell I involves the same transaction or
occurrence, it involves the same Property, the same “Borrower,” the same
Debt/Note, the same Trust Deed, and the same purported default. Therefore, this
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judicial foreclosure action falls within the plain language of Rule 13(a), and
should have been filed as a counterclaim in Mitchell I – but it wasn’t.
It is well-settled law in Utah that any party failing to comply with Rule 13(a) is
barred from asserting such claims in future litigation because "the purpose of rule 13(a) is
to ensure that all relevant claims arising out of a given transaction are litigated in the
same action." Nu-Med USA v 4Life Research 190 P.3d 1264, 1267. This Rule is
absolute:
[A] counterclaim not presented to the court on a matter involving the
same transaction is forever barred. Cox v. Dixie Power Co., 81 Utah
94, 16 P.2d 916; Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Mellen, 50 Utah 49, 165 P.
791; Moss v. Taylor, 73 Utah 277, 273 P. 515.
Todaro v. Gardener, 285 P.2d 839, 842 (Utah 1955); Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, 246
P.2d 608 (Utah 1952) (if a party fails to plead a compulsory counterclaim it is precluded
from asserting it in a subsequent action); Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc. 116 P.3d 962, 963 (Utah
2005)(compulsory counterclaims not brought in the first case were waived).
The Supreme Court has plainly held that Rule 13(a) applies to “any” available
claim without exception:
[T]hey likewise had the obligation under rule 13(a) to raise any available
counterclaims arising out of the same transaction. To hold otherwise
would eviscerate the purposes of rule 13(a) and allow a party to gain
full advantage of the affirmative defenses afforded a genuine party in
interest, while avoiding any obligation to raise counterclaims in the same
action.
Raile Family Trust v. Promax Dev. Corp., 24 P.3d 980, 983.
There is no dispute BNYM could have plead a judicial foreclosure action as a
counterclaim in Mitchell I since it was claiming a previous default by Mitchell, which is
all that was required to make such a claim “available.”
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But instead of barring BNYM’s claim, the trial court created its own novel
exception to Rule 13(a) in order to save BNYM from its voluntary decision to not comply
with Rule 13(a).
The court held that even though a judicial foreclosure action would be based on
the same transaction at issue in Mitchell I, and was available when BNYM filed its
answer, it nevertheless was not a compulsory counterclaim based on its novel policy
conclusion that a “borrower is not entitled to deprive the lender of its choice” between
non-judicial foreclosure and judicial foreclosure.
There is not, however, any legal support in Utah Law for the court’s novel
holding, and it is in fact directly contrary to the plain language of the Rule and the
governing Utah law interpreting Rule 13(a).
A.
The Federal Court’s interpretation of Federal Rule 13 in Texas may not be
applied to create an exception in Utah’s Rule 13(a).
The trial court improperly held it may resort to federal case law regarding the
interpretation of Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to interpret
Utah’s Rule 13(a) on the flawed theory that there was no applicable Utah law interpreting
the Rule. To the contrary, there is plenty of law on point, it is just contrary to what the
trial court wanted to do, because it clearly holds there are no exceptions.
Nevertheless, the trial court relied on Douglas v. NCNB Texas Nat’l Bank, 979
F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 801) for the proposition that since Federal Rule 13 did not require a
judicial foreclosure to be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in Texas, Utah’s Rule 13
also should be interpreted so as to not require the filing of a judicial foreclosure action as
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a compulsory counterclaim.
But the court’s interpretation and reliance on Douglas is misplaced because there
was a key federal legislative provision in effect – the Rules Enabling Act, adopted by
Congress – which expressly provides that the Federal Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.” 22 U.S.C. § 2072.
The Fifth Circuit therefore observed in Douglas that “[t]he federal counterclaim
rule, Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(a), is inapplicable if it abridges, enlarges, or modifies the plaintiff’s
or defendant’s substantive rights.” The Fifth Circuit then proceeded to analyze Texas law
(not the Federal Rule itself) and concluded that applying Federal Rule 13(a) to judicial
foreclosures in Texas would impermissibly “abridge the lender’s substantive rights and
enlarge the debtor’s substantive rights” under Texas law, which would be an
impermissible violation of the Rules Enabling Act.
It concluded: “Thus, we believe it is appropriate in this case to follow the state’s
practice of permitting a lender to refrain from filing a counterclaim on overdue
notes and to wait to pursue either a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure remedy.” In
considering the lender’s “rights” under Texas law, the Fifth Circuit looked to Kasper v.
Keller, 466 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1971) which held that Texas’s own
Rule 13 could not be applied to modify substantive rights because of Rule 815, Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, which similarly “directs that ‘These rules shall not be construed
to enlarge or diminish any substantive rights or obligations of any parties to any civil
action.’”
Douglas therefore does not help BNYM, or justify the court’s exemption because
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there is no similar legislative limitation in Utah. Accordingly, the 5th Circuit would
reach a totally different result if it were applying Federal Rule 13 to a Utah case. When it
would look to Utah’s Rules for a similar statutory limitation prohibiting the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure from modifying substantive rights, it would find none. Accordingly, it
would hold that Federal Rule 13 could demand the filing of judicial foreclosure
counterclaims in federal cases in Utah.
B.

The trial court based its novel exception on an unsupported legal conclusion.
Furthermore, the trial court erred because it created it’s novel exception based on

its summary conclusion that the “lender has the option of selecting judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure, and because the borrower is not entitled to deprive the lender of
its choice, the court concludes that a counterclaim for judicial foreclosure is not
compulsory and BNYM was not obligated to assert it as a counterclaim in Mitchell I.”
The trial court, however, failed to identify any Utah law holding that a debtor may
not “deprive the lender of its choice.”
The court slides right past the fact its conclusion lacks any legal support and is
contrary to the reality that Rules routinely affect parties’ “choices.” Rule 13 in particular
obviously affects every defendant’s “choice” whether to bring an available counterclaim
or not.
It does not matter under Rule 13(a) whether the defendant wants to pursue its
claim at that particular time or not. If the defendant wants to use the courts of Utah to
pursue that claim, it must do so at the time the courts require. That is simply the “cost”
of using Utah’s courts to pursue one’s judicial remedies.
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C.
The trial court’s policy exception is contrary to the Supreme Court’s policy
decision to not have any exceptions.
The Supreme Court, as a matter of public policy, has determined in its wisdom
that in order to preserve the limited resources of the courts, as well as to reduce the
burden on the parties, that ALL related available claims “shall” be presented at the same
time or be waived, without any exception. The trial court (and this Court) have no
authority to say otherwise.
Consequently, the Rules as adopted by the Supreme Court may by design affect
the contractual “choices” of parties.
D.

The trial court improperly attempts to rewrite Rule 13(a).
Given the plain language of Rule 13(a) mandating that “any” available related

claim “shall” be filed as a counterclaim, and the lack of any exception in Rule 13(a) for
judicial foreclosures, the trial court has improperly attempted to rewrite Rule 13(a) to add
an exception the Supreme Court has not elected to include.
“When we interpret a procedural rule, we do so according to our general rules of
statutory construction.” In addition,
[W]hen interpreting a statute, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that
the legislature used each term advisedly according to its ordinary and
usually accepted meaning. Additionally, we presume[] that the expression
of one [term] should be interpreted as the exclusion of another. We
therefore seek to give effect to omissions in statutory language by
presuming all omissions to be purposeful.
Aequitas Enterprises v. Interstate Inv. Group, 2011 UT 82, ¶15(citation omitted).
A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts are not to infer substantive
terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be
based on the language used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute
to conform to an intention not expressed.
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Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 371 (Utah 1994)(citations omitted); Platts v.
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997)(“The judiciary is obligated to
interpret statutes as they are crafted, not to redesign them.”).
Had the Supreme Court intended to create an exception to Rule 13(a) for judicial
foreclosures, it could have easily done so. It didn’t. Therefore, neither the trial court nor
this Court can recognize any exception to the plain language: “A pleading shall state as a
counterclaim any claim…”
“It is the duty and practice of this court to adhere to the plain language of a rule.
And where the text of the rule is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends, and we
need not resort to additional methods of interpretation.” St Jeor v. Kerr Corp., 2015 UT
49, ¶12
Allowing trial courts to rewrite the plain language of Rule 13(a) post hoc to
include exception(s) not included by the Supreme Court is a slippery slope that would
promptly eviscerate Rule 13(a) since everyone would assert their newfound “right to
choose.” Which is why the Supreme Court has wisely not allowed any exceptions.
E.

Lender agreed to be bound by Utah law, including Rule 13(a).
Contrary to the trial court’s summary conclusion that Mitchell did not have any

right to “deprive” lender of its choice, lender had already agreed that Mitchell did have
that right by contract when it agreed in the Trust Deed to be bound by “Applicable” Utah
law, which would naturally include Rule 13(a)’s requirement as to when to bring any
judicial foreclosure action.4

“Applicable Law” is defined in the Trust Deed as “all controlling applicable federal, state and
local statutes, regulations, ordinances and administrative rules and orders …”
4

27

This Security Instrument shall be governed by federal law and the law of the
jurisdiction in which the Property is located. All rights and obligations
contained in this Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and
limitations of Applicable Law.
Exhibit B Complaint: Trust Deed Page 8 ¶16. REC.21.
Lender has thereby conceded by contract that any possible option or “right” it may
have to choose between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure may be deprived by
Mitchell filing suit because it is “subject” to “any requirements and limitations” of Utah
law, such as Rule 13(a). Accordingly, the court’s assumption that Lender’s right to
choose was unlimited was flawed.
Accordingly, due to all the flaws in the trial court’s analysis, and since its novel
exception is directly contrary to the plain language of Rule 13(a) and the governing law
interpreting it, the court’s refusal to enforce Rule 13(a) must be reversed and the judicial
foreclosure action dismissed with prejudice because it is forever barred.5

III.

Trial court erred dismissing Mitchell’s counterclaims based on Res Judicata.
BNYM, under the guise of a Motion to Dismiss, improperly asserted a fact

sensitive affirmative defense, Res Judicata, by summarily claiming without any actual

5

Inasmuch as the judicial foreclosure action is barred, the trial court did not acquire any subject
matter jurisdiction to entertain it, since it is outside of the class of cases which a trial court could
possibly hear, and therefore beyond the authority of the court to entertain. Therefore, all of the
trial court’s actions in this case are once again palpably null and void,” Bott supra, and must be
vacated.
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support that the exact same issues being raised in the counterclaims in this case had all
been previously raised and decided in Mitchell I.
Knowing that it was misleading to say so, BNYM nevertheless argued summarily
that because each numbered “cause of action” was dismissed by the Mitchell I court, that
each and every claim and issue was in fact addressed and decided, when in fact, as
BNYM’s counsel was fully aware, the Mitchell I court had failed to recognize that the
numbered “causes of action” each actually had several separate and distinct claims/issues
being raised which had been grouped together for convenience’s sake and that the “cause
of action” did not contain just the single claim or issue which the Mitchell I court was
actually dismissing by dismissing the entire cause of action where it was located. See
Opposition.
By not being candid with the court about what happened in Mitchell I, BNYM’s
counsel misled the court in this case into mistakenly assuming that all of the claims and
issues raised in the counterclaims had in fact previously been resolved in BNYM’s favor,
even though they had not been. And therefore the trial court mistakenly dismissed
Mitchell’s counterclaims wholesale, without the required analysis for each individual
issue or claim supposedly precluded by Res Judicata.
A.
Had the facts alleged in the counterclaims been properly accepted as true, the
Motion to Dismiss would have been denied.
Many of the facts alleged in the counterclaims, especially those set out in the
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First,6 Second,7 and Third,8 counterclaims, directly contradicted BNYM’s unsupported
factual assertions that all issues and claims in the counterclaims were in fact completely,
fully, and fairly litigated, and finally resolved on the merits, in Mitchell I.
Since the court was entertaining a Motion to Dismiss, the court was obligated to
accept Mitchell’s version of the facts regarding what happened in Mitchell I as pled in
detail in the counterclaims as true, as well as all reasonable inferences therefrom.
______________
The court, however, erred by not accepting Mitchell’s allegations as true, in
particular it did not accept the factual allegations that many of the issues and claims
previously raised in Mitchell I were never even acknowledged as existing, let alone
addressed, by the Mitchell I court, see ¶¶93-155 of the Answer and Counterclaim which
set forth several controversies alleged in Mitchell I which were not decided on the merits.
REC.565-576, such as the numerous claims seeking declaratory judgments which were
never entered, and therefore did not result in a final judgment resolving all disputes on
the merits.9

6

Finality of Mitchell I ¶¶91-121.
Lack of Res Judicata Effect of Mitchell I ¶¶122-145
8
Denial of Due Process and Denial of Open Court ¶¶ 146-150
9
Given the numerous claims and issues raised in the counterclaims, and the page limitations on
this brief, it would be impossible to set forth all of the issues/claims with full analysis as to each,
but the proper analysis was set forth in Mitchell’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, and
therefore the Court is referred to it in order to see exactly how the BNYM’s argument was
flawed, issue by issue. Since BNYM asserted Res Judicata, it naturally bears the burden of
making sure the court properly set out its analysis for this court to review, and since it failed to
do so, Mitchell need not rebut any actual ruling on any individual claims or issues because there
are no such findings to rebut.
7
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For example, the counterclaims correctly claims that to this day, there has not been
a declaratory judgment entered as to who in fact owns the Mitchell Debt, and requests
such a declaration. Therefore, accepting this fact as true, the trial court was obligated to
hold that the counterclaim seeking that declaratory judgment is not barred by Res
Judicata. But it mistakenly failed to do so. Therefore, the dismissal of that counterclaim
must be reversed.
And so on and so on through each counterclaim (which cannot all by addressed
individually here given the page limit but can be reviewed in Mitchell’s Opposition.
This Court may not make the same mistake here. In order for it to affirm the
dismissal of any of the counterclaims and/or issues, it must naturally find that the trial
court in fact made the proper analysis. And if it didn’t, then this Court must summarily
reverse and reinstate the counterclaim since it is not its job to do the trial court’s
mandatory analysis in the first instance.
B.
Res Judicata was improper because Mitchell I did not result in a final
judgment on the merits.
Despite the fact BNYM has the burden to prove that Mitchell I resulted in a final
judgment on the merits for each issue or claim challenged, it made no attempt to do so.10
A “final judgment” is a legal term of art indicating that all controversies between

10

The test for claim preclusion is:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is
alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or be one that could and
should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a
final judgment on the merits.
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, P 34, 73 P.3d 325.
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the parties have been resolved on the merits.
For an order to constitute a final judgment, it must end the controversy between
the litigants. Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, P12, 37 P3d 1070 (citing Kennedy v.
New Era Indus., Inc, 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979). In other words to be a final
order, the court’s decision must “dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on
the merits of the case.” Kennedy, 600 P.2d at 536 (internal quotations omitted);
Anderson v. Wilshire Investments, 2005 UT 59 ¶ 9.
Since BNYM failed to prove by evidence in the record that each and every
controversy between the parties was resolved on the merits in Mitchell I, it once again
failed to meet its burden of actually proving claim preclusion, as compared to merely
asserting it exists. And the trial court erred in simply assuming that there was a final
judgment without actually conducting the proper analysis and setting it forth in its ruling
for this Court to review.
C.
BNYM failed to present a prima facie claim of claim preclusion sufficient to
dismiss all of the Counterclaims.
The following counterclaims were not raised in Mitchell I and therefore are not
barred by Res Judicata: First, seeking judicial declarations collaterally attacking Mitchell
I judgment and appellate decision as void; Second, seeking judicial declaration Mitchell I
does not preclude any issue or claim raised in the counterclaim; Third, seeking
declaratory judgment Mitchell I is void due the denial of due process, and denial of an
open court; Fourth, seeking judicial declaration Note and Trust Deed are void in that
there is no entity in whose favor they were supposedly made; Sixth, seeking judicial
declaration there was not a valid notice of cure which is a contractual prerequisite for any
judicial foreclosure; Seventh, seeking judicial declaration of BNYM’s rights under the
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Note and Trust Deed; Fourteenth, seeking reformation of the Note so that Mitchell may
resume paying thereon; Sixteenth, seeking judicial declaration the Debt is unsecured and
may not be judicially foreclosed because the security has been severed from the debt;
Eighteenth, seeking quiet title against several new parties, including co-defendants
America First and Pepperwood HOA; Nineteenth, seeking quiet title action regarding
ownership of the Note and the Trust Deed themselves; and Twenty-third, alleging civil
conspiracy and seeking a class action for bringing this judicial foreclosure. REC.538
Since BNYM did not demonstrate that any of these counterclaims could have
been, or should have been raised in Mitchell I, it waived that argument. Therefore, the
trial court erred in dismissing them on that basis sua sponte because by raising this
ground sua sponte it impermissibly intruded into the role of BNYM’s counsel by raising
a ground waived by BNYM’s own counsel. “Preservation of the integrity of the
adversarial system … precludes the court from infringing upon counsel's role of
advocacy.” Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983)(court improperly raised issue
not raised by parties).
Raising an issue not addressed by the parties is inappropriate and outside of
the discretion given the governing tribunal because it encroaches upon the
advocate responsibility conferred upon counsel.
Hilton Hotel and Pacific Reliance Insurance v. Industrial Commission, 897 P.2d
352, 356 (Utah App 1995); See also Chevron v. State Tax Comm’n, 847 P.2d 418 (UT
App 1993); Waters v. Jorgenson, 2001 UT App 164 ¶17.
Since the trial court denied Mitchell a fair hearing on this issue by raising it sua
sponte for the first time in its ruling, REC.1016, on behalf of BNYM who did not raise it,
the sua sponte ruling is a denial of due process and therefore is null and void.
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IV. Trial Court erred in dismissing counterclaims collaterally attacking Mitchell I.
The Trial Court erred in dismissing the First and Third counterclaims because they
collaterally attack the rulings or actions of the courts in Mitchell I as being null and void.
See ¶¶115-155.
As the Supreme Court has plainly held, a void judgment may be collaterally
attacked at any time, in any proceeding.
A void judgment,” says Mr. Black, “is in reality no judgment at all. It is a
mere nullity. ... It can neither affect, impair, nor create rights. As to the person
against whom it professes to be rendered, it binds him in no degree whatever, … it
does not raise an estoppel against him. As to the person in whose favor it
professes to be, it places him in no better position than he occupied before; it
gives him no new right, but an attempt to enforce it will place him in peril. … It
is not necessary to take any steps to have it reversed, vacated, or set aside. But
whenever it is brought up against a party, he may assail its pretensions and show
its worthlessness. It is supported by no presumptions, and may be impeached in
any action, direct or collateral. Black on Judgments, Sec. 170.
State v. Bates, 61 P. 905, 906 (Utah 1900).
Consequently, Mitchell has every right to bring the collateral attacks against the
void actions of the Mitchell I courts, and the trial court cannot simply refuse to do its job.
Therefore, the First and Third counterclaims must be reinstated.

V.
Trial Court erred by granting BNYM summary judgment without BNYM
satisfying its initial burdens with supporting evidence.
The trial court did not require BNYM to meet its initial burdens before granting it
summary judgment on its judicial foreclosure claim, and has thereby unfairly injured
Mitchell by denying her constitutional right to a jury trial.
If the [requirements of the rules] are not fulfilled, both in letter and spirit,
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the summary judgment procedure becomes a vehicle of injustice rather than a
salutary medium of reaching a swift but just result on a pure matter of law, as
intended by the framers of the rules.
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993)(citations omitted).
As the Supreme Court plainly explained in Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P3d 600, ¶ 19
(Utah 2006) Rule 56(a) has two distinct tests which must both be fully satisfied by a
movant before a court may properly grant summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
A.
Trial court erred by not applying the proper standard for summary
judgment motions.
Since BNYM is the plaintiff, in order to prove it was entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law, it had to prove its entire prima facie case with evidence in
the record:
Where the moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant must
establish each element of his claim in order to show that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. . . .
Orvis at ¶10.
BNYM, however, failed to establish each and every element of its claim. It did
not even bother to identify the elements of a breach of contract claim, or a claim for
judicial foreclosure, let alone address them or prove them with admissible evidence in the
record. It therefore failed to meet its initial burden to prove entitlement as a matter of
law, and the court was bound to deny its motion. It therefore erred by granting it.
BNYM also failed to meet its second initial burden by failing to show with
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admissible evidence in the record that each element of its claims is in fact undisputed.
Since BNYM failed to prove each fact was undisputed, Mitchell did not even have
any obligation to dispute any fact asserted before the court should have denied the
Motion:
“[U]nless the moving party meets its initial burden to present evidence
establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘the party opposing the
motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’ Harline, 912 P.2d at 445 & n. 13 (quoting K & T, Inc. V. Koroulis, 888 P2d
623, 628 (Utah 1994))” (emphasis added). “Utah law does not allow a summary
judgment movant to merely point out a lack of evidence in the non-moving party’s
case, but instead requires a movant to affirmatively provide factual evidence
establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact.”
Orvis at ¶16 (emphasis added).
Rule 56(c)(1) clearly explains how this must be done: “A party asserting that a fact
cannot be genuinely disputed … must support the assertion by: (c)(1)(A) citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including … documents, … affidavits, … or
other materials.”11
Mitchell didn’t even need to oppose BNYM’s defective motion because it is only
after the moving party meets its initial burden on both prongs that “[t]he burden on
summary judgment then shifts to the non-moving party to identify contested material
facts, or legal flaws in [the motion].” Orvis at ¶ 10 (emphasis added).
Consequently, even if Mitchell had not opposed the Motion the court was
obligated to deny it before even reading Mitchell’s opposition.

As will be discussed more fully below, BNYM’s reliance on Alvin Denmon’s affidavit was
misplaced because it was inadmissible.
11
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[S]ummary judgment may not be entered against the nonmoving party merely by
virtue of a failure to oppose; the rules of civil procedure allow entry of summary
judgment against a defaulted party only "if appropriate." Id. R. 56(e). Thus,
while the nonmoving party's failure to oppose a motion for summary judgment
will often result in a determination that there are no factual issues precluding a
grant of summary judgment, the district court must still determine whether the
moving party's pleadings, discovery, and affidavits demonstrate its entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law. Id. R. 56(c);
Pepperwood Homeowners Ass'n v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137, ¶ 6 (reversing summary
judgment as plain error due to plaintiff’s failure to prove every element of the claim with
evidence, even though no opposition was filed).
As this Court explained: “If ‘the moving party fails to properly support its motion
for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is permitted to 'rest on the allegations in
[its] pleadings.'" Pepperwood at ¶ 8 (citations omitted).
The Pepperwood court then analyzed the answer to the complaint, and held: “In
the face of Mitchell's denials, Pepperwood needed to establish its claim with
admissible evidence that Mitchell was obligated by virtue of the Declaration to pay the
claimed amounts.” Pepperwood at ¶ 9.
Accordingly, where BNYM failed in this case to address or to disprove Mitchell’s
denials in her Answer (and counterclaims) with actual admissible evidence in the record
(as compared to bare assertions), Mitchell could rest on her denials alone, without even
opposing the Motion, and summary judgment should have been summarily denied.
Pepperwood puts the burden squarely on the shoulders of the court to make sure
BNYM had in fact met both of its initial burdens based on the evidence actually in the
record. See Mountain State Tel. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah
1984)(court’s decision based on “the evidence before the court.”), Olympus Hills
Shopping Center v. Smith’s, 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah App. 1994)(summary judgment
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only “when reasonable minds could not differ on the facts to be determined from the
evidence presented.”)(emphasis added).
This case is similar to the situation in Orvis: “Orvis provided no evidence to show
that the elements [of his affirmative defense] had been satisfied; in fact, Orvis did not
even allege that those elements had been met. ... Because Orvis did not offer the
necessary evidence to show that all the elements of [his affirmative defense] were met,
he failed to meet his initial procedural burden on summary judgment.” Orvis at ¶12.
Consequently, Orvis’ motion for summary judgment was summarily rejected.
Similarly, the moving party in Conner v Union Pacific had argued for summary
judgment by arguing that there was no evidence contrary to its position, but failed to
support each and every one of its own facts with an affidavit or other evidence (even
though it had submitted an affidavit in support of some facts). The Supreme Court held
that approach resulted in a fatal factual dispute:
[I]ts argument is nothing more than a mere assertion, which is wholly
insufficient to support a summary judgment motion. ... Because [movant] failed to
show by affidavit or otherwise [it’s argument,] we hold there was a genuine issue
of material fact and that the district court erred in granting [movant’s] motion for
summary judgment.
Conner v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 972 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1998).
Since BNYM failed to fully support its Motion with affidavits or other
admissible evidence as to each specific fact in each individual element in each claim, the
“bare, self-serving allegations” of Mitchell to the contrary in her Answer and
Counterclaim and Declaration defeat summary judgment without the need of any counter
affidavit as to the unproven facts. Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984). In other
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words, Mitchell may simply “rest on the allegations in [her] pleadings,” Parrish v. Layton
City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Utah 1975), because BNYM merely made bare
allegations of many of its “facts” without introducing actual admissible proof thereof into
the record. See also Wilkinson v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998)
(moving party failed to support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits showing
all of the facts were undisputed, and therefore non-moving party could rely on the bare
allegations in her pleadings).
Absent actual admissible evidence in the record proving each fact, the trial court
could not logically conclude that said fact actually exists. As the Conner Court noted:
“In short, [movant] does not cite anything in the record upon which the district court
could have relied to justify its grant of summary judgment in [movant’s] favor.” Id.
The trial court in this case erred in granting BNYM’s Motion for Summary
Judgment because there was not evidence in the record as to each and every element/fact
BNYM had to prove.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Allowing the Denmon Affidavit.
Before addressing the numerous gaps in BNYM’s Motion, it is important to note

that BNYM’s purported “evidence” for many of its supposedly “undisputed facts,” the
Denmon affidavit, REC.808, was inadmissible. The court erred in admitting it and
relying upon it.
Rule 56(c)(4) expressly limits the affidavits which may be submitted in support of
a motion for summary judgment as follows:
An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on
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personal knowledge, must set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and
must show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.
Denmon’s affidavit is not admissible since it shows he is incompetent because he
either clearly lacks any personal knowledge, or the affidavit fails to “show that [he] is
competent to testify on the matters stated” as explicitly required by Rule 56(c)(4). See
e.g., Preston v. Lamb, 436 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1968)(in order for affidavit to be used in a
motion for summary judgment, it must set forth facts as would be admissible in
evidence); Treloggen v. Treloggen, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985)(a supporting affidavit must
be based upon an affiant’s personal knowledge).
Many of the facts asserted would also be inadmissible since all Denmon does is
regurgitate inadmissible hearsay from various documents in a form affidavit prepared by
BNYM’s counsel without any effort to comply with the requirements for business
records, etc.
Furthermore, it was a denial of due process for the trial court to consider
Denmon’s Affidavit without first allowing Mitchell to take Denmon’s deposition, since
the affidavit was the first time BNYM disclosed him as a potential witness in violation of
Rule 26. His deposition would likely confirm he was not in fact competent to testify as to
any of the “facts” he supposedly has personal knowledge of. The Trial Court erred by
not giving Mitchell the opportunity requested to take his deposition first, to show he is
not competent to testify and lacks any personal knowledge.
Furthermore, the Court was obligated to ignore the Denmon Affidavit because he
was never identified as a witness as required by Rule 26(a). Rule 26(d)(4) plainly states:
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“If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response to discovery,
that party may not use the undisclosed witness, document or material at any hearing
or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.”
Therefore, the Court must disregard the Denmon Affidavit in its entirety.
C.
BNYM has not proven all of the elements of its claim with evidence in the
record.
BNYM’s claim is first and foremost a breach of contract claim: “The elements of a
prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party
seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages.” Bair v.
Axiom Design L.L.C., 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001).
1.
Mitchell.

BNYM failed to prove there was in fact a contract between it and

BNYM failed to introduce any evidence to prove there was in fact a contract
between it and Mitchell, whereby Mitchell owed it any contractual obligation.
Since BNYM was not an original party to the Note and Trust Deed, what it needed
to provide was evidence that it in fact became the owner of the Debt, and thereby
acquired a contractual obligation from Mitchell. But since BNYM fails to introduce into
the record any chain of ownership of the Debt, and/or the Note or the Trust Deed, it fails
to prove this element and its Motion should have been summarily denied for this reason
alone.
Furthermore, since BNYM failed to introduce any evidence to prove its claim of a
contract between them is undisputed, Mitchell’s bare denials in her Answer and
Declaration and the Declaration of her Husband that BNYM has no contractual rights
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since she never entered into a contract with BNYM, and that it is not in fact the current
owner of the Debt, and is not entitled to foreclose on the Property, are sufficient to create
a disputed fact which defeats summary judgment.
The court therefore again erred in granting summary judgment for failing to prove
the existence of a contract is undisputed.
2.
BNYM has not proven that it and its predecessors have fully
performed every contractual obligation.
Even assuming arguendo that there is a contract between the parties, BNYM does
not submit any evidence into the record to prove that it and/or its predecessor(s) have
fully performed all of their obligations under the purported contracts, as is required to
prove a breach of contract claim.
In particular, there is no evidence introduce into the record that BNYM complied
with either Paragraph 20 or 22 of the Trust Deed requiring advance written notice of any
alleged breach/default proving Mitchell an opportunity to cure it – BEFORE BNYM filed
suit. REC.22-23 There is also no evidence of any advance notice from Lender of the
possibility it would accelerate the Debt BEFORE BNYM or its predecessor(s)
supposedly accelerated the debt, or even any evidence that the Debt was ever accelerated
before this suit was filed.
Indeed, in direct breach of Paragraph 20, BNYM attempts to accelerate the Note in
the Complaint itself. REC.22
BNYM cites the Denmon Affidavit to say the acceleration took place, but his
Affidavit does not show when this supposedly happened, or how he has any personal
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knowledge as to when, or even if, the purported acceleration in fact took place. His
Affidavit therefore does not prove full compliance, or that compliance is undisputed.
BNYM totally fails to go through each of the purported obligations of itself or its
predecessor(s) under the contracts and then show how the contractual obligations were in
fact satisfied, by introducing evidence in the record.
Therefore, there was no evidence in the record upon which the court could
reasonably rely in concluding as a matter of law that Paragraphs 20 and 22 were in fact
complied with by BNYM and/or its predecessor(s).
The same applies to any and all other contractual obligations. BNYM simply has
not proven any compliance on its side of the agreements so as to be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
3.
BNYM fails to prove as a matter of law that Mitchell breached any
contract term.
While BNYM does assert generally that Mitchell breached the Note by not making
payments as scheduled, it does not actually introduce any evidence into the record that
Mitchell in fact breached, or was in default. Therefore, it once again failed to satisfy its
initial burdens as to this critical element.
All BNYM points to as a “record” of the alleged breach is the Denmon Affidavit,
but the Denmon Affidavit once again is inadmissible since he lacks any personal
knowledge as to any alleged breach, and he has based his “testimony” on nothing but
hearsay.
Furthermore, given the uncontroverted assertions in the Answer that Mitchell was
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fraudulently induced into missing payments by a knowingly false promise of a
guaranteed loan modification, which was done for the purpose of inducing the alleged
“default” so that BNYM and other could profiteer therefrom, (which factual assertions
must be deemed true at this stage unless BNYM has affirmatively proven with admissible
evidence they are not – which it has not done) BNYM has not proven by actual evidence
in the record that there was in fact a breach or default, because it has not rebutted the
possible defense that BOA agreed to the nonpayment.
Therefore, BNYM has again failed to meet its first burden on this critical element,
and the court again erred in not summarily denying the Motion.
4.
BNYM has failed to prove it is entitled to $1,343,034.81 in damages as a
matter of law.
As to the final element, damages, BNYM has not introduced any admissible
evidence into the record to prove the actual amount of the damages it claimed in this
partial motion for partial damages. There is no evidence in the record providing the
actual calculation of the principal or the variable interest. There is no evidence of any
fees, penalties, etc.
There simply is no evidence at all as to how BNYM arrived at the summary
amount of damages it “asserts” is owed. Each component of damages necessarily
requires admissible evidence to prove that component of damages was in fact suffered
but none has been provided.
For example, BNYM, does not set forth any evidence as to the interest it claims it
is owed. It does not provide any evidence of the interest rates it supposedly used to reach
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the total amount of interest it claims, which is critical since the interest rate is variable,
and therefore in order to prove the amount of interest owed at trial, BNYM would have to
introduce into evidence each of the various rates it applied and when they were used,
showing they were in compliance with the Rider, etc. and showing the calculations.
(Which calculations also were not provided under Rule 26.)
Likewise, there is no evidence in the record as to any fines, penalties, costs, that
BNYM appears to be claiming but has not identified because it simply submitted a single
total lump sum amount.
There is no evidence in the record to support the lump sum amount asserted.12 As
such it is nothing more than a bare assertion.
Accordingly, BNYM once again failed to prove with actual evidence in the record
the damages as a matter of law. And the Court erred in not denying the Motion for failing
to prove entitlement as a matter of law.
It also failed to prove with evidence in the record that the amount claimed was
undisputed. And since it was nothing more than a bare assertion of a lump sum,
Mitchell’s bare denials were sufficient to create a factual dispute.
5.
BNYM fails to introduce any evidence it is entitled to judicially
foreclose the Trustee’s Lien.

12

The Denmon Affidavit does not constitute admissible evidence of any damages. Denmon does
not claim to have personal knowledge of all of the factors which have been included in the
amount claimed, or whether they were proper, etc. Nor is there any indication that Denmon as a
mere “foreclosure specialist” who “robo-signs” affidavits all day has the requisite expertise to
actually calculate the amount of damages actually owing (if any) so as to give an expert
testimony as to the amount.
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BNYM must also prove it has an interest in the Property to foreclose as required
by the one-action rule it is invoking, but it doesn’t. See UCA 78B-6-901(1)(“There is
only one action for the recovery of any debt, or the enforcement of any right, secured
solely by mortgage upon real estate and that action shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter.”).
While being careful to not claim actual ownership of the Debt, BNYM claims
instead that it is the “holder” of the Note by means of a blank endorsement (without any
admissible evidence that the wet ink note was actually transferred to it by the original
lender). But since one may be the “holder” of a note without actually owning it, for
example as a custodian or in order to try to collect it for the benefit of the actual owner,
being a mere “holder” of the Note obviously does not carry with it any rights to the
Trustee’s Lien, which is necessarily owned and held by the owner of the Debt since it is
inseparable therefrom, as discussed above.
Accordingly, BNYM has failed to introduce any evidence that it had any interest
to foreclose. Once again, this evidentiary omission summarily defeats its Motion for a
judicial foreclosure because BNYM has failed to prove as a matter of law that it may
foreclose the Trustee’s Lien as its own.
And once again BNYM failed to make any attempt to show how its claim to be the
holder was undisputed, so it is a bare assertion which Mitchell’s bare denials render
disputed. Consequently, the trial court again erred by granting the Motion when BNYM
did not meet its initial burdens.
D.

Mitchell’s alleged defenses precluded any award of summary judgment.
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It has long been settled that “a judgment can properly be rendered against a
defendant only if, on the undisputed facts, the defendant has no valid defense.”
Disabled American Veterans v. Hendrixson, 340 P.2d 416, 417 (Utah 1959)(emphasis
added).
Mitchell’s potentially “valid defenses,” unless all of them were proven invalid
with admissible evidence, should have defeated summary judgment by BNYM, since
they defeat any claim by BNYM of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law since the
court must assume the facts alleged are true.
BNYM and the Trial Court, however, totally ignored the defenses raised by the
pleadings.13
Since the Trial Court failed to hold that BNYM had successfully disproved every
potentially “valid defense” as plead, with evidence in the record, it once again erred in
holding that BNYM is entitled to judgment as a matter of law while the defenses are still
unresolved.
E.

Summary re BNYM’s summary judgment.
Given all of the missing evidence regarding the elements of BNYM’s claim, and

the missing evidence rebutting the possible defenses, the court clearly erred in not
denying BNYM’s Motion for failing to satisfy its initial burden to prove entitlement as a
13

The potentially valid defenses include: Payment; Lack of Standing; Lack of Privity of
Contract; Lack of Valid Assignment; Offset for Violations of Debtor’s Rights; Waiver; Estoppel;
Breach by Plaintiff; Setoff; Release; Statute of Frauds; Lack of Consideration; Fraud; Statute of
Limitations; Waiver of Compulsory Counterclaim; Breach of Covenant of Good faith and Fair
Dealing; Waiver of Default; and any more that may yet be discovered.
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matter of law. It also erred in not denying the Motion due to BNYM’s failure to prove
with evidence in the record that the facts as to each of the elements are undisputed. The
reality is that BNYM did not even try to meet its initial burdens, and it was the court’s
duty to summarily deny the Motion.
Consequently, this Court must reverse the summary judgment, and vacate the
“Final Judgment” based thereon.
VI. Trial court erred in treating its purported “Final Judgment” as a final
“judgment”.
The trial court insists that the sua sponte “Final Judgment” it entered on
November 27, 2017 was in fact a final “judgment” REC.1027, and has improperly taken
steps based on it being a final “judgment,” even though it is only an interlocutory order
and no final “judgment” has yet been entered in this case.14
A.
The Trial Court violated Rule 58A(c) by preparing and entering its own
“Final Judgment” sua sponte.
The court violated Rule 58A(c) by preparing its own “Final Judgment” sua sponte,
entered on November 27, 2017, the same day as it entered the Final Order and Judgment
on BNYM’s Motion for Summary Judgment, REC.1016, when there had not been a
proposed final judgment prepared and circulated first as expressly required by Rule
58A(c), .
Rule 58A(c) clearly gave Mitchell the right to see any proposed judgment before it

14

Admittedly, if this Court agrees, then it must dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction, but this was Mitchell’s only course to get this issue resolved given the trial court’s
recalcitrance in recognizing the true nature of its “Final Judgment.”
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was filed with the court, and the option to approve or object to the form thereof before it
was filed with the Court. Nowhere in Rule 58A, or elsewhere in the Rules of Civil
Procedure, is the court granted the authority to prepare and summarily enter a “final
judgment” itself.
Consequently, the Court impermissibly denied Mitchell her due process right to
notice of the proposed judgment, and a meaningful opportunity to review the proposed
judgment and to be heard on her objections thereto – including the obvious defect that it
was premature.
This blatant denial of due process renders the November 27, 2017 “Final
Judgment” null and void. See Judson v Wheeler RV, 2012 UT 6, ¶18 (judgment is void
where due process is not provided); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, Co., 817 P.2d
382 (Utah App 1991)(judgment is void “if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with
due process.”); Workman v. Nagle Constr., 802 P.2d 749, 750-754 (Utah App. 1990)(any
order issued without due process is “void”).
B.

The purported “Final Judgment” is not in fact a “judgment.”
While the Court has called it document “Final Judgment,” it is not in fact or law a

“judgment” as that term is defined by and used in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
because in its November __ ruling granting BNYM’s motion for summary judgment, the
Trial Court expressly reserved two questions for further adjudication. Since the
purported “Final Judgment” was entered before those adjudications are complete, it is not
in fact a “judgment.”
Rule 54(a) plainly states: “"Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree or
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order that adjudicates all claims and the rights and liabilities of all parties or any
other order from which an appeal of right lies.”
Rule 54(b) further clarifies that:
any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and may be changed at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
Until all claims and issues involving all parties are resolved on the merits, any
document, even one called a “Final Judgment,” is not in fact or law a “judgment.” It is
only an interlocutory order.
For an order to constitute a final judgment, it must end the controversy between
the litigants. In other words to be a final order, the court’s decision must “dispose
of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the case.”
Anderson v. Wilshire Investments, 2005 UT 59 ¶ 9.
A judgment is not final even where it fully resolves issues advanced by one
party, or even where it resolves a majority of the issues advanced by both parties.
Rather, a judgment is final only if it "dispose[s] of the case as to all the parties,
and finally dispose[s] of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the
case." Put more succinctly, a judgment is final only if it "ends the controversy
between the parties litigant."
DFI Properties LLC v. GR 2 Enterprises LLC, 2010 UT 61, ¶17 (citations omitted);
Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, ¶ 12 (“to be considered a final order, the trial court's
decision must dispose of the claims of all parties”).
Inasmuch as the purported “Final Judgment” explicitly left issues open for further
adjudication, it obviously did not “end the controversy between the parties litigant” on
“the merits” and is only an interlocutory order, despite the Court’s manifest intent that it
be a final and appealable “judgment” ready to be enforced by a sheriff’s sale.
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Accordingly, the Court’s treatment of it as a “judgment” was reversible error
which must be reversed and vacated.
1.
The question of damages after May 31, 2017 have yet to be
adjudicated.
The court granted BNYM’s motion for partial summary judgment seeking as
damages $1,343,034.81 “plus additional interest, costs, taxes, and other fees owing to
plaintiff incurred after May 31, 2017.”
8.
Based on the above, judgment should enter in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant Paula A. Mitchell for the amount of $1,343,034.81, plus additional
interest, costs, taxes, and other fees owing to plaintiff incurred after May 31,
2017.
Order REC.1020.
Since the purported “Final Judgment” does not contain a determination of
Mitchell’s liability for any amounts post May 31, 2017, it obviously does not resolve on
the merits the full amount of the claimed liability. And no “judgment” will until such
additional amounts are adjudicated.
Therefore, for this reason alone the purported “Final Judgment” is still merely any
interlocutory order subject to change, contrary to the trial court’s belief.15
2.
The question of the amount of attorney fees being claimed remained
unresolved when the “Final Judgment” was entered.
BNYM’s motion for summary judgment, was only a motion for partial summary

15

Indeed, the fact that this amount remains unadjudicated means that not only there is no final
judgment yet, it also means this Court does not have any appellate jurisdiction to even be
considering this appeal, but given the trial court’s insistence that it is final, Mitchell has to appeal
just to resolve this dispute.
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judgment because it did not seek summary judgment for the amount of attorney fees, only
for a ruling on liability therefore.16
When ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the Court ruled on liability for
attorney fees but expressly reserved the amount of attorney fees for adjudication in the
future.
16. Pursuant to the terms of the parties’ written agreements, Plaintiff is awarded its
attorney fees and costs incurred in this action in an amount to be determined
upon the filing of plaintiff’s Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs.
Order REC.1022.
The amount was again preserved for future adjudication in the “Final Judgment.”
See ¶16 of “Final Judgment” (awarding fees “in an amount to be determined”).
It is well established that reserving the amount of attorney fees for further
consideration prevents a ruling from being a “judgment.” The final judgment rule
"requires that all claims, including requests for attorney fees, be decided in order for a
decision to be appropriately appealed to this court." Loffredo at ¶14.
Where attorney fees are awarded to a party, whether denominated as an
item of "costs" or not, and the amount is not stated in the judgment rendered
on the merits of the case, and evidence must be taken afterwards by the trial
court either by affidavit or live testimony, there is no final judgment for the
purposes of appeal until the amount of the fees has been ascertained and granted.
ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, ¶ 12.
16

It is nearly impossible to obtain summary judgment as to the amount of attorney fees since
such amount must not be in dispute. "Specifically, where attorney fees are awarded to a
prevailing party on summary judgment, the undisputed, material facts must establish, as a matter
of law, that (1) the party is entitled to the award and (2) the amount awarded is reasonable."
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah App 1989)(emphasis added). Accordingly,
this damage issue must be decided at trial.
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The Court mistakenly assumed in its ruling on the Rule 59 Motion that the recent
amendments to Rule 58A and Rule 4 somehow altered the forgoing governing law, and
therefore the explicit reservation of the amount of fees for future adjudication in the
“Final Judgment” did not render it nonfinal.
This Court has already rejected the trial court’s theory after explicitly pointing out
that Rule 73 “is addressed to post-judgment motions” for attorney fees:
In its August 9, 2017 order, the district court awarded attorney fees in an
amount to be determined at a later date. Thus, the order, by its own terms,
contemplated additional actions by the parties in order to resolve issues still in
dispute. Accordingly, because rule 4(b)(1)(F) applies only to post-judgment
motions for attorney fees and no such motion was filed in this case, traditional
case law concerning the finality of judgment for purposes of appeal still
applies.
McQuarrie v. McQuarrie, 2017 UT App 209, ¶ 4.
This Court explained that the recent amendments to Rule 58A and Rule 4 do not
alter the traditional requirement that a judgment is only final if it resolves all claims, and
that Rule 58A’s new reference to attorney fees only applies to Rule 73 post-judgment
motions for attorney fees, not bifurcated motions for fees which straddle a purported
“judgment,” with the liability determination on one side of the “judgment” and
determination of the amount on the other, as was the case in McQuarrie, and as is the
case here.
Rule 58A(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not alter this court's
analysis. While rule 58A(f) does not reference rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, it mirrors the language of rule 4(b)(1)(F) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure in stating that a "motion or claim for attorney fees" does not
affect the finality of a judgment. … Thus, it is clear that rule 58A(f) is meant to
address those situations in which a party files a motion for attorney fees after
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entry of a judgment that otherwise would be final for purposes of appeal. It
does not affect the appealability issue in this case in which the district court's
order was never final because it contemplated additional actions by the
parties.
McQuarrie at ¶ 5.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in assuming that the Rule 58A and Rule 4
amendments somehow rendered the “Final Judgment” “final” when the “Final Judgment”
clearly was not final because it expressly reserved for further adjudication the amount of
fees to be awarded.
Consequently, this Court must hold the “Final Judgment” is not in fact a “final
judgment,” and reverse or vacate all actions mistakenly taken by the trial court
erroneously treating it as a final judgment.
C.
Trial court erred by including an order to the sheriff in the interlocutory
“Final Judgment.”
The trial court erred by including Paragraph 14 in the “Final Judgment” whereby
the court orders the court clerk “to issue an Order of Foreclosure Sale effectuating this
Final Order and Judgment,” because it was not in fact a final order and appealable
“judgment,” as required by the judicial foreclosure statute before a sale may be ordered.
The Legislature plainly declared in UCA 78B-6-901(1) that any judicial
foreclosure must comply with the statutory requirements it has created: “There is only
one action for the recovery of any debt, or the enforcement of any right, secured solely by
mortgage upon real estate and that action shall be in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter.”
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the statutory requirements of
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judicial foreclosure are mandatory: “The statute is therefore mandatory, and, having
spoken upon the subject of mortgage foreclosures, its mandate must be obeyed by all
courts.” Hammond v Wall, 171 P. 148, 151 (Utah 1917).
Foreclosure proceedings on a mortgage securing a note in default must be
conducted in accordance with the statutes, Sec. 104-55-1 to 9, U. C. A. 1943. It is
necessary to have the court ascertain what sum of money, if any, is due and
owing on the note and mortgage before the court can properly issue an order of
sale to liquidate the debt through sale of the security.
Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 144 P.2d 276, 281 (Utah 1943).
Accordingly, the trial court was bound to comply with Subsection 78B-6-901(2)
which plainly provides what must be included in a “judgment” before a judicial
foreclosure sale may be ordered:
A judgment shall include:
(a)

the amount due, with costs and disbursements;

(b)
an order for the sale of mortgaged property, or a portion of it to
satisfy the amount and accruing costs;
Section 78B-6-902 then addresses what happens if the sale proceeds are not
sufficient to cover “the judgment” previously entered in compliance with Section
901(2).17 Section 78B-6-904 on the other hand addresses what happens if there is a
surplus above “the amount due” on the trustee’s lien, as should be set forth in “the

17

Section 902 provides:
If it appears that the proceeds of the sale are insufficient and a balance still remains due, the judgment
shall be docketed by the clerk and execution may be issued for the balance as in other cases. A general
execution may not be issued until after the sale of the mortgaged property and the application of the
amount realized to the preceding judgment.
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judgment.”18 Section 78B-6-906 then creates the right of redemption which also requires
a “judgment.” Likewise Rule 69C which governs the redemption process also repeatedly
refers to “the judgment.”19
Given the repeated references to a “judgment” and/or the “amount due” in the
forgoing statutes and Rule, it is readily apparent that unless there is in fact an actual final
“judgment” containing the total “amount due,” as required by Section 901, a deficiency
or surplus cannot be calculated, and a redemption cannot be effected.
Until an actual final “judgment” with a total “amount due” is entered, the trial
court therefore has no statutory authority to issue an Order to sell.
This is confirmed by the Supreme Court’s explicit ruling in Stewart Livestock, that
a court must ascertain “what sum of money, if any, is due and owing … before the court
can properly issue an order of sale.”
Accordingly, there is no debate the trial court’s “Final Judgment” does not comply
with Section 901(2)(a), and therefore is the statutorily required “judgment” necessary to
allow a judicial foreclosure. It therefore should not have presumed to authorize a
foreclosure sale based thereon.

18

Section 904 provides:
If there is surplus money remaining after payment of the amount due on the mortgage, lien or
encumbrance, with costs, the court may order the amount paid to the person entitled to it. In the
meantime the court may direct it to be deposited with the court.

19

Rule 64 provides:
(c) How made. To redeem, the redemptioner shall pay the amount required to the purchaser and shall
serve on the purchaser:
(c)(1) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the redemptioner claims the right to redeem;
(c)(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged if necessary to establish the claim; and
(c)(3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien.
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The court therefore improperly issued the Order of Foreclosure Sale20 prematurely
because it did so before it had “ascertained what sum of money, if any is due and owing,”
and had not entered a statutorily compliant “judgment” with the total “amount due.”
Absent the total “amount due,” it is a legal impossibility to properly calculate any
deficiency or surplus, and therefore it would be a legal impossibility to make those
calculations based on the “Final Judgment.”
Consequently, it is clear that since the requirements of Section 901(2)(a) had not
been satisfied when the purportedly “Final Judgment” was entered, the Court had not yet
acquired the statutory authority to order a foreclosure sale under Section 901(2)(b),
rendering its Order unauthorized, null and void. It therefore must be vacated by this
Court.
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Inasmuch as this is a statutory judicial foreclosure action where the court has
heretofore allowed attorney fees to BNYM under UCA 78B-6-908, if Mitchell prevails
on this appeal in a permanent manner, she will become entitled to her attorney fees as a
matter of reciprocity, especially if this Court determines that the judicial foreclosure
claim is barred as waived under Rule 13(a), or that BNYM lacks standing to bring this
action. It is therefore requested that if Mitchell prevails on tis appeal that the Court
award her her fees, the amount of which will be determined on remand by the trial court.

20
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CONCLUSION
The trial court’s actions should be vacated in their entirety as being null and void
due either to BNYM’s lack of standing or because the this action is barred by Rule 13(a).
In the alternative, the Court should declare the “Final Judgment” is not in fact final and
therefore the court lacked any statutory authority to issue the Order for Foreclosure Sale,
rendering it a nullity which must be vacated.
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